My research is in moral philosophy, especially normative ethics, and political philosophy. A major theme in my research is the relation between, on the one hand, what is the most prominent debate in normative ethics—that between consequentialists and their critics—and, on the other hand, what is arguably the most prominent debate in political philosophy—the debate over the correct conception of our concern for equality as an ideal, i.e. the correct conception of egalitarianism. In my doctoral dissertation, I argue, among other things, that the consequentialist infiltration of egalitarian thought has distorted the debate over the correct conception of egalitarianism, rendering egalitarians vulnerable to powerful objections that a concern for equality need not invite.

A key question of my current research is how (indeed whether) we can morally justify some people being worse off than others. This is a question I explored in my doctoral research and it is at the heart of the research project, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, which I am completing at the Equality Studies Centre at University College Dublin.

This thesis considers two questions that are at the heart of philosophical theorizing about egalitarianism: ‘Which of the two pre-eminent justifications for distributive inequality in contemporary political philosophy should egalitarians consider more acceptable?’, and ‘What is the basis for egalitarians’ characteristic presumption of distributive equality such that it is distributive inequality which egalitarians hold to require a special moral justification?’. With respect to the first question, this thesis seeks to vindicate the justification for distributive inequality advanced by John Rawls as part of his landmark liberal theory of justice. With respect to the second question, this thesis rejects the view that egalitarians’ presumption of distributive equality is based upon a belief in such equality’s intrinsic moral value.

Available on request

This paper puts forward an account for Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle which locates the grounds for this principle in Rawls’s difference principle. More specifically, this papers argues that a commitment to fair equality of opportunity as a condition upon permissible inequality is an implication of a prior commitment to inequality’s being to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.

Draft may be available on request

This paper argues that the debate over how to provide a rationale for deontological constraints against harming has been improperly influenced by consequentialist assumptions, in the absence of which there is no “paradox”, or “irrationality”, about these constraints which deontologists need to answer for.

Draft may be available on request