DOCTORAL THESIS
Equality and Contractualism.
Abstract: There has been no question more important for contemporary philosophers of egalitarianism than that of whether the so-called ‘luck egalitarian’ account of just socioeconomic, or distributive, inequality is an account egalitarians can accept. According to the luck egalitarian account, distributive inequality is just insofar as it derives from people’s voluntary choices but, as many philosophers have argued, egalitarians cannot accept this account compatibly with their commitment to equality of status, or equality of respect: their commitment, that is, to people in a society being regarded and treated equally, by each other and by the institutions they have in common. My focus in this thesis, then, is on the question, ‘What account of just distributive inequality can egalitarians accept compatibly with their commitment to equality of status?’ I argue that, judiciously modified, it is the account that proponents of the luck egalitarian account have sought to undermine: that put forward by John Rawls. To make this argument I enlist the ‘contractualist’ theory of morality of a philosopher whose position in contemporary theorising about egalitarianism has been notoriously difficult to identify: T. M. Scanlon.
Thesis supervisors: Professor Véronique Munoz-Dardé and Dr Han van Wietmarschen.
PAPERS IN PROGRESS
What Egalitarians Shouldn’t Believe
Abstract: In an influential article, “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Martin O’Neill argues, inter alia, that: (a) the levelling down objection equally gives ‘telic’ conceptions of distributive egalitarianism and ‘deontic’ conceptions of distributive egalitarianism a case to answer, and so this objection does not show that deontic conceptions of distributive egalitarianism are more plausible than telic conceptions; (b) the most plausible conception of distributive egalitarianism is that which O’Neill calls ‘non-intrinsic egalitarianism’; and (c) non-intrinsic egalitarianism is neither a telic nor a deontic conception of distributive egalitarianism. In this article, I argue that we should reject both of O’Neill’s claims (a) and (c) and instead accept that: (d) the levelling down objection gives only telic conceptions of distributive egalitarianism a case to answer, which they cannot, and (e) non-intrinsic egalitarianism should be identified as a deontic conception of distributive egalitarianism. It follows from claims (b), (d) and (e) that the most plausible conception of distributive egalitarianism is what I call ‘non-intrinsic deontic egalitarianism’.
Egalitarianism and its Discontents
Abstract: In this article, I first call into question an assumption that pervades critical discussions of egalitarianism: namely, that the only form, or idea, of equality egalitarians want to see realised is the equal distribution of some important distribuendum in a society, that egalitarians, qua egalitarians, are concerned only with distributive equality as an ethical ideal. I explain how this assumption underpins the criticisms that: (a) egalitarians are committed to policies that bring about distributive equality by levelling down and (b) egalitarians are committed to policies that bring about distributive equality in a way that ignores the separateness of persons . The assumption, however, is unwarranted since, as many philosophers have pointed out, egalitarians also want to see realised equality in the form of people in a society being regarded and treated equally, by each other and by the institutions they have in common.
A central task in theorising about egalitarianism, then, is to provide an account of how these two ideas of equality—distributive equality and ‘social’ equality—combine in egalitarian thought and I argue that, in his recent work, T. M. Scanlon provides the resources for a compelling account of this. More specifically, I argue that: (c) the contractualist thesis that our institutions and practices are morally right if they are justifiable to everyone who is required to accept or participate in them embodies the idea of social equality and (d) the commitment to have institutions and practices that are justifiable to everyone who is required to accept or participate in them militates against institutions and practices that generate severe distributive inequality.
If You’re an Egalitarian, How Must You Think?
Abstract: According to John Rawls, even though distributive justice requires distributive equality (or, more specifically, distributions of socioeconomic goods which satisfy Rawls’s ‘difference principle’), as individual agents our practical deliberations do not need to be informed by the aim of realising distributive equality in society. Rather, distributive equality is to be pursued only through the design and functioning of a society’s major social, political and economic institutions—society’s “basic structure”. G. A. Cohen’s critique of Rawls famously calls this ‘basic structure restriction’ into question: questioning whether it is consistent with taking distributive equality seriously as a requirement of distributive justice to leave the pursuit of distributive equality to society’s basic structure. Cohen argues that sufficient concern for distributive equality as a requirement of distributive justice requires that the aim of achieving distributive equality in society directly inform individual agents’ practical deliberations: that we ought to make personal decisions—such as which job to take, or how to spend our disposable income—with this aim in mind. In this article, I argue that the notion of integrity presents the same difficulty for Cohen’s suggestion as Bernard Williams showed this notion to present for the utilitarian’s suggestion that the aim of maximizing aggregate happiness should directly inform individual agents’ practical deliberations. Cohen’s suggestion thus betrays a conception of distributive egalitarianism that shares one of the most off-putting aspects of utilitarianism.
The Doctrine of Triple Effect and the Loop Case
Abstract forthcoming